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Chapter XV
Private Enforcement Against
International Cartels in Latin
America: A US Perspective
DANIEL A CRANE'

A recent empirical study estimates that from 1990 to the end of 2005, 283 private
international cartels were discovered and that the overcharges from these cartels
totaled $500 billion. 1 Estimates of the percentage of all detected cartels range
from one in six or seven to one in 10. 2 If the one in 10 number is correct, that
would mean that overcharges from international cartels in the last 15 years were
$5 trillion, or about $330 billion per year. Even assuming that the detection rate is
higher today due to the success of the US Justice Department's leniency program
and stepped up anti-cartel enforcement around the world, it is clear that international cartels exact hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal overcharges from
consumers around the world every year. Indeed, as John Connor shows in his
chapter in this volume, international cartels impose overcharges that exceed those
of purely domestic cartels. 3
The United States historically has been the leader in private anti-cartel enforcement. Features that make cartel enforcement in US courts attractive include class
actions, broad discovery rights, a judiciary receptive to antitrust claims, a welldeveloped body of cartel law, liberality in proof of damages, and the treble damages
remedy. As long as the US played a dominant role in private anti-international cartel

• Professor, Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law.
1
John M Connor and C Gustav Helmers, 'Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels J 9902005', (2006) <http:/ /www.agecon.purdue.edu/working_papers/workingpaper.connor. l l. l 0.06.pdf>.
2
Sentencing Options: Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission (July JS, 1986),
available in United States Sentencing Commission: Unpublished Public Hearings 1986, at JS (1988)
(Statement of Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg) (estimating that only one in JO cartels is
discovered); OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee,
Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National
Competition Laws (April 9, 2002), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf> at
3, 13 (citing Peter G Bryant and E Woodrow Eckard, 'Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught'
73 Review Of Economics & Statistics 531 ( 1991)) (estimating that one in six or seven cartels is caught
and prosecuted).
3
John M Connor, 'Latin America and the Control of International Cartels', ch XIV in this book.
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enforcement, there seemed to be little need to encourage the development of private
cartel enforcement in other countries.
However, a recent development in US law makes US courts inhospitable to
claims by consumers who made their purchases in a foreign country from an
international cartel that also operated in the United States. In F Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd v Empagran SA, 4 the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
who bought the price-fixed goods in a foreign country cannot sue in the United
States unless they can show that their particular claim arises from the cartel's anticompetitive effect in the United States. Although it remains to be seen how the
lower courts will interpret Empagran's new test, it seems unlikely that US courts
will continue to be friendly to claims by foreign purchasers.
This paper explores the need for enhanced private anti-cartel enforcement in
Latin America in light of Empagran and what we have learned about international
cartels from contemporaneous economic scholarship. Empagran creates both a
need and an opportunity for private anti-cartel enforcement in Latin America.
Contrary to the fears of many opponents of private enforcement, however, such
enhancement of private antitrust enforcement need not extend beyond cartels or
open a 'Pandora's box' of private antitrust litigation abuses.
Part I of the chapter surveys the Empagran decision, paying particular attention
to the role of amicus curiae briefs by foreign governments. Seven foreign governments (Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Ireland, and The Netherlands) submitted four amicus curiae briefs, all of them
urging the Court to adopt a rule restrictive on the rights of foreigners to sue in
US courts. Several of the briefs argued that allowing foreign purchasers to sue in
the US could stifle the development of private anti-cartel enforcement in other
countries. For example, the brief submitted on behalf of Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, Ireland, and The Netherlands argued that the institutional distinctiveness
of the private anti-cartel enforcement apparatuses emerging in those jurisdictions
could be destroyed if foreign plaintiffs were constantly abandoning their home
courts to sue in the US. The success of these appeals for space to create a culture
of indigenous private enforcement provides motivation for institutional reforms
that would enable such a culture to emerge in Latin America.
Part II considers the challenges facing private cartel enforcement in Latin
America-which range from the lack of private rights of action to enforce
anti-cartel laws, to various administrative, procedural, evidentiary and cultural
hurdles. It singles out three issues as particularly important for private anti-cartel
enforcement: claim aggregation, access to information, and judicial or administrative competence.
Part III makes the case for at least a limited regime of private anti-cartel
enforcement. Although I have written critically about private antitrust enforcement

4
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us 155 (2004).
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in the US and its dulling effects on public enforcement,5 it is important to separate
anti-cartel enforcement from antitrust enforcement more generally. If there is
ever an appropriate place for private antitrust enforcement, it is against cartels. To
be clear, I do not claim that consumers are the best anti-cartel enforcers. The most
socially costly effect of a cartel's supracompetitive pricing is not that consumers
pay more but that some consumers substitute to other products (which creates a
deadweight loss); yet would-be consumers of the cartelized products usually will
not have standing to assert a claim. So government enforcement should always
remain the centerpiece of any anti-cartel program, and it is critical that private
enforcement not be allowed to detract from the government's anti-cartel mission.
Nonetheless, private enforcement provides a valuable complement to government
enforcement and, if properly structured, could redound to the benefit of Latin
American consumers.
Private anti-cartel enforcement is not a silver bullet that will instantly and
without cost slay the cartels. Private litigation can be distracting and expensive,
and foreign observers often rightly react to the excesses of US litigation culture.
Creating a system of private antitrust litigation must be part of a larger package
of properly balanced institutional choices.

I. The Challenges of Empagran
A. The Vitamins Cartel and the Jurisdictional
Reach of US Antitrust Law
Beginning in the 1990s, a gigantic and complex international vitamins cartel
took shape. 6 It included multinational corporations located in Belgium, France,
Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. The victims
of the cartel, however, did not correspond neatly with the countries in which the
co-conspirators were located. One economic study estimated that the 'Vitamins,
Inc' cartel (as its own members called it) affected over $34 billion of commerce,
that the cartel members earned between $9 and $13 billion of profits, and that
58 per cent of these profits were taken from consumers outside the US, the EU
and Canada. 7 In the private litigation that followed, the plaintiffs included vitamin wholesalers from Ecuador, Panama, Australia, Mexico, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, Indonesia, Ukraine and the United States.

5

Daniel A Crane, 'Antitrust Antifederalism' 96 California Law Review I, 40-43 (2008).
I generally adapt the facts recounted here from Alvin K Klevorick and Alan O Sykes, 'United States
Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran' in
Eleanor M Fox and Daniel A Crane (eds), Antitrust Stories (New York, Foundation Press, 2007).
7
Klevorick and Sykes, above n 6, at 363, citing estimates by John M Connor.
6
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The cartel seems to have been cracked by the US Justice Department, in
cooperation with many other antitrust authorities. The Department credited its
leniency program, which grants amnesty from criminal prosecution to cooperating defendants in certain circumstances. In particular, the Department cited
the cooperation of Rhone-Poulenc, which was the first member of the cartel to
cooperate.
Competition authorities in the US, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan
and South Korea levied substantial fines against the cartel. For present purposes, the
interesting aspect of the case concerns the private lawsuit brought under US antitrust law in the US District Court in Washington, DC. 8 The Washington litigation
included as plaintiffs both companies that had bought vitamins in the US and companies that had bought vitamins outside the US. The claims of the foreign purchasers raised an interesting and unresolved issue of US antitrust law: can plaintiffs who
pay too much money for products outside of the US because of a global price-fixing
conspiracy that also harms US consumers sue under the Sherman Act?
Prior to the Empagran case, the lower federal courts had resolved this issue in
conflicting ways. For example, the federal appeals court in New York had held that
people who bought and sold art in the Christies' and Sothebys' auction houses
in London could bring claims under federal antitrust law when Christies and
Sothebys fixed buyer and seller commissions in both London and New York. 9
The New York court interpreted the relevant federal statute, the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 10 to permit the claims by the foreign
purchasers and sellers since the same price-fixing conspiracy also harmed US
purchasers and sellers. 11 On the other hand, the federal court of appeals in Texas
rejected that position and held that foreign purchasers who did not make their
purchases in the US market could not sue under the Sherman Act. 12
The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the vitamins case for review
and sided with the interpretation of the Texas court. 13 The Court's reasoning in
interpreting the FTAIA is somewhat technical and dense, and need not detain us
here. The upshot is that the Court held that a foreign plaintiff cannot establish
that the Sherman Act applies to his claims unless he can show that his injury arose
from anti-competitive effects in the US market. In other words, the only way that
a foreign purchaser of a price-fixed product could sue under the Sherman Act
would be if he established not only that the same cartel that fixed his prices also
fixed the prices of US consumers, but additionally that the cartel was only able to

8

Empagran SA v F Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd, No Civ 001686 (TFH) (DOC, 2006).
Kruman v Christie's Intern PLC, 284 F 3d 384 (2d Cir 2002).
io 15 USC§ 6a.
11
Christopher Mason, The Art of the Steal: Inside the Sotheby's-Christie's Auction House Scandal
(Putnam, 2004) tells an engaging story of the history of the Christie's and Sotheby's price-fixing conspiracy. As with the vitamins cartel, the Justice Department's leniency program played an important
role in the detection and prosecution of the cartel's leaders.
12 Den Norske Oljeselkap As v HeereMac Vof, 241 F 3d 420 (5th Cir 2001).
13 542 us 155 (2004).
9
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fix the prices in the foreign market because of its success in fixing the prices in
the US market.
It remains to be seen whether this test will effectively curtail any suits in the
US by foreign purchasers from international cartels. In Empagran, the Supreme
Court left open the possibility that the plaintiffs could establish US jurisdiction
by establishing that their injury was not caused independently of the harm to the
US market. 14 On remand, however, the federal appeals court in Washington, DC,
construed this potential loophole very narrowly, holding that a plaintiff would
have to show 'a direct causal relationship' between the US injury and the foreign
injury. 15
There remains also the possibility that a foreign purchaser could sue in US
courts under the law of a foreign country, and hence get the benefit of liberal US
discovery rules and the general receptiveness of US courts to private litigation. A
few plaintiffs have tried this strategy, 16 thus far without any success.
So it is a good bet to assume that, for all intents and purposes, the US courts are
now closed to claims by foreign purchasers who bought from international cartels. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is not the focus of this paper. As we shall
see, however, the decision was applauded by a number of non-US governments.

B. The Enforcement Gaps Created by Empagran
As noted earlier, the Empagran plaintiffs included Mexican, Panamanian and
Ecuadorian companies that imported vitamins into Latin America. There is no
doubt that the vitamins cartel had a serious negative impact on consumers in
Latin America. However, the Court prohibited the Mexican, Panamanian and
Ecuadorian plaintiffs from having their claims heard in the United States.
One reaction is 'who cares?' After all, the cartel was discovered, punished by
competition officials in the US, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan and
South Korea, and cartel members paid over $900 million in fines in the US and
approximately the same amount in fines in other jurisdictions. Additionally, cartel
members paid $2 billion to settle the civil cases. Further, at least 11 individuals
received jail sentences. 17
It is not as if the Mexican, Panamanian and Ecuadorian plaintiffs would have
turned around and issued refund checks to their customers if they had received
damages. As I will discuss momentarily, anti-cartel enforcement is more important
for its deterrent rather than for its compensatory effects. So why is it important

14

Ibid, at 175.
Empagran SA v F Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd, 417 F 3d 1267, 1271 (DC Cir 2005).
16
See, eg, Information Resources, Inc v Dun & Bradstreet Corp, 127 F Supp 2d 411 (2000) (rejecting
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over private damages claims arising from alleged violations of
Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome).
17
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Empagran, 542 US 155
(2004) (No 03-724), 2004 WL 234125.
15
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for Latin America to allow private rights of action when the rest of the world
seems to be doing such a good job at deterring international cartels?
Part of the answer is that Latin America should not assume that the US, EU
and other large antitrust enforcers have the interests of Latin American consumers at heart. As Al Klevorick and Alan Sykes have written, 'the United States is
largely free to shape its policy toward international cartels to promote the national
interest'. 18 And it often does so. For example, the US has a statute called the WebbPomerane Act 19 that exempts export cartels from US antitrust law. So long as they
do not raise prices in the US, a cartel of US vitamin producers would be free under
US law to fix prices for vitamins exported into Latin America.
Why would the US allow such a thing to happen? United States antitrust
enforcement officials routinely refer to cartels as a form of theft. 20 Why would the
US permit US companies to steal from Latin American consumers? The answer is
that what is bad for Latin American consumers may be good for US companies,
and indirectly for the US economy.
It is a well-known fact that cartels simultaneously harm consumers and help
producers. Cartels benefit producers in two different ways. For one, price fixing
allows producers to raise prices above a competitive level and hence transform
consumer surplus into producer surplus. But beyond these wealth transfers, there
may also be some efficiencies from price fixing. Price fixing may allow producers
to engage in better planning, eliminate waste and coordinate activities in a way
that helps them to save production costs. 21 It may also allow smaller firms that
could not otherwise compete enter the market. 22
Such efficiency arguments for price fixing are never admissible in US antitrust
cases. 23 In Latin America, however, the story is much more nuanced. Some Latin
American countries, including, for example, Peru, Colombia and Mexico, follow
a rule of per se illegality for price-fixing arrangements. 24 Other countries, like

18

Klevorick and Sykes, above n 6, at 378.
15 USC§§ 61-65.
20
See, eg, Press Release, US Dept of Justice, 'Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $300
Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy' (Oct 13, 2005) (quoting Attorney General
Alberto R Gonzalez), <http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/212002.htm> (stating that
price fixing 'robs American consumers of the benefit of competitive prices').
21
The WTO Secretariat has recognized that export cartels may have some associated efficiencies,
although it has expressed doubt that this is very often the case. Report by Secretariat, WTO Doc WT/
WGTCP/M/21 (2003), at 44.
22
See generally, D Daniel Sokol, 'What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the
Appropriate Solution?' 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 967-82 (2008) (arguing that the
effects of export cartels are not well understood).
23
Examples of cases where US courts held that the defendants were not allowed even to argue
that their cartel behavior was efficiency justified include United States v Socony- Vacuum Oil Co, 3 I 0
US 150 (1940) and Addystone Pipe & Steel Co v United States, 175 US 211 (1899), aff'g 85 F 271 (6th
Cir 1898).
24 Gabriela Mancero-Bucheli, Competition Law of Latin America and the European Union
(Huntington, NY, Juris Pub, Inc 2001 ), at 124--3 I; OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America:
Peer Reviews of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, OECD Report Nov 9, 2006 (hereinafter
OECD Peer Reviews Report), at 268.
19
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Venezuela, follow a general rule of per se illegality for price fixing, subject to the
possibility of block exemptions for price-fixing behavior. 25 Some jurisdictions,
like Argentina and Brazil, reject per se treatment and require proof of economic
harm-or at least market power from which economic harm can be presumedin every case. 26 In some jurisdictions, like Chile, it is unclear whether or not the
per se rule applies to cartel behavior. 27
So, there is far from consensus on whether cartel behavior can ever be justified.
But even where the inclination is not to permit cartelists to attempt to justify their
conduct in the ordinary case, the justification for per se treatment lies not in the
impossibility that a cartel would ever have efficiency benefits. Rather, it lies in
the near certainty that cartels will harm consumers and the extremely high probability that whatever efficiencies a cartel may produce will be insufficient to offset
the harm. The per se rule is a rule of judicial administrability, not a statement of
absolute confidence that cartel arrangements never create efficiencies.
Now suppose that the producer benefits from cartelization are felt only in the
domestic market and the consumer harms are felt only in the foreign markets. In
that case, from the perspective of the domestic economy, price fixing looks like a
good deal. The domestic producers will make more money, and hence create more
jobs28 and pay more taxes in the domestic market. The cartel will affect terms of
trade. Moreover, the domestic jurisdiction will not have to internalize the harms of
the anti-competitive conduct. Export cartels are just like aiming a giant smokestack
across a country's border so that all of the pollution is absorbed by another country. They are a highly effective way to internalize benefits and externalize costs.
The problem with relying on the US and the EU to police international cartels
does not stop at export cartels. Suppose that the G7 countries perfect anti-cartel
enforcement to the point that they reach a 'Beckerian equilibrium' in G7
markets-that is to say, a point where everyone knows that the expected cost of
price fixing ( the probability of detection times the penalty) exceeds the profits to
be made from price fixing. 29 Now suppose that you are the vitamins cartel and
you know that it is economically irrational to fix prices in G7 countries because
the expected penalty outweighs the expected benefit. There is still a great deal of
money to be made by price fixing in other jurisdictions, including those in Latin
America, that do not have nearly as aggressive anti-cartel enforcement. Even if you
are caught in one or two of the jurisdictions, the fines that you will pay are far less
than the profits you are going to make by price fixing across the region.

25
26

Ibid.

OECD Peer Review Report, above n 24, at 16, 74.
27
Ibid, at 212.
28
The creation of more jobs is not certain, since the cartel will probably have to lower output when
it raises prices. But as it earns more money, the cartel is likely to invest it in other ventures which may
create more jobs in the domestic economy.
29
See Gary S Becker, 'Crime & Punishment: An Economic Approach' 76 Journal of Political
Economy 169-217 (1968).
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The famous US Supreme Court Justice Oli'{er Wendell Holmes had an interesting
approach to legal analysis. He said that we should look at the law from the perspective of the 'bad man', the man who cares only for the legal consequences of
his behavior. 30 So think about anti-cartel enforcement from the perspective of the
'bad men' in the cartels. To them, anti-cartel enforcement is just a cost of doing
business. As anti-cartel enforcement gets 'better' from the perspective of consumers, the cost of doing business goes up from the perspective of the cartelists. And
what happens when the cost of business goes up in one place? Economic theory
predicts that, over time, business will tend to shift to lower-cost places of doing
business. So if anti-cartel enforcement gets progressively better in G7 countries
then one prediction is that more and more international cartel behavior will be
directed at countries-including those in Latin America-where the 'costs of
doing business' are comparatively lower. This may not be true of industries that
are inherently local because of high transportation costs or local market peculiarities, but it is true of many fungible and portable products that have been
the subject of international cartels. In other words, the success of international
anti-cartel enforcement in the US, EU and Japan may be a magnet for more cartel
behavior in Latin America.
Thus far, I have only made the case that the Empagran carve-out of non-US
purchaser claims combined with improved anti-cartel enforcement in G7 countries creates the possibility for worse cartel conditions in Latin America. This
suggests that there is an imperative to step up anti-cartel enforcement in Latin
America. It does not yet establish the case for private enforcement. For a perspective on that issue, we now turn to the amicus briefs of the foreign governments.

C. The Foreign Government Amicus Curiae Briefs
It is customary in US courts-particularly in the Supreme Court-for people,

corporations, governments, etc, who are not parties to the case but have an interest in its outcome to file amicus curiae briefs urging their view of the case on
the Court. When the Empagran case reached the Supreme Court, seven foreign
governments (Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Ireland and The Netherlands) submitted four amicus curiae briefs, all of
them urging the Court to adopt a rule disallowing suits by foreign purchasers in
US courts. 31

30

Oliver W Holmes, Jr, 'The Path of the Law' 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 459 ( 1897).
The briefs filed in F Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd v Empagran, SA, are Brief for the Government of
Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, 2004 WL 226389 (Feb 3, 2004) (hereinafter 'Canada
Brief'); Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the
Kingdom of The Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL 226597 (Feb 3,
2004) (hereinafter 'UK Brief'); Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, 2004 WL 226390 (Feb 3, 2004) (hereinafter 'Japan Brief'); Brief of the Federal Republic
of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL 226388 (Feb 3, 2004)
(hereinafter 'Germany Brief').
31
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The briefs articulated a number of common themes. All assured the Supreme
Court that their native jurisdictions were vigorously engaged in anti-cartel measures and that they did not require supplementary enforcement by private plaintiffs in US courts. All worried that a decision allowing suits by foreign plaintiffs
would impede vigorous anti-cartel enforcement in their domestic jurisdictions,
for example by discouraging cartelists to seek leniency in exchange for cooperation. The governments all argued that a rule allowing foreign purchaser claims in
US courts would violate the sovereignty of the foreign governments, that it would
contradict principles of international law, and that it would fail to comport with
universally recognized principles of comity.
All of the governments but Japan 32 emphasized an additional point of particular importance here: each jurisdiction allowed private rights of action to
recover damages for price fixing. Analytically, this argument was presented with
two different emphases.
First, the briefs stressed that allowing foreign purchaser suits in the US would
seriously undermine the development of indigenous private enforcement in the
amici countries because certain features of the US civil litigation and antitrust
system-particularly treble damages, contingency fee arrangements, one-way
attorney fee shifting, class actions, and liberal .discovery rules-would inevitably
drive all of the foreign purchaser plaintiffs to the United States. For instance, the
UK Brief argued strenuously that allowing foreign purchaser claims would harm
the private antitrust enforcement in the governments' own jurisdictions:
Expanding the jurisdiction of this generous United States claim system could skew
enforcement and increase international business risks. It makes the United States courts
the forum of choice without regard to whose laws applies, where the injuries occurred
or even if there is any connection to the court except the ability to get in personam
jurisdiction over the defendants. Lord Denning best captured these anomalies when he
observed: 'As a moth is drawn to the light, so a litigant is drawn to the United States. If he
can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.' Smith Kline & French
Labs Ltd v Bloch, [1983] 1 WLR 730 (CA 1982). Enlarging the prescriptive jurisdiction
of the United States to provide a US antitrust remedy to foreign buyers with no cognizable US nexus will attract even more litigants and will increase the number of private
antitrust claims filed in United States courts. 33

The governments also made a second point: in their own national deliberations,
they had rejected many of the aspects of US civil litigation that made litigation in
US courts so attractive to plaintiffs. For example, the Irish Government pointedly

32
Although there is a theoretical possibility of private antitrust enforcement in Japan, there appear
to be few if any successful private cases. See Wulfgang Wurmnest, 'Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global
Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law' 28 Hastings International &
Comparative Law Review 205,213 (2005), n 40 (collecting sources).
33
UK Brief, above n 31, at * 13-14. See also Canada Brief, above n 31, at * 14 (noting that the 'policy
of the United States permitting recovery of treble damages in civil antitrust actions likely would prove
powerfully attractive to most Canadian plaintiffs injured by anti-competitive behavior in Canada').
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noted that class actions are not allowed in Ireland. 34 The Canadian Government
noted that Canada deliberately rejected the treble damages model because 'punitive
sanctions for illegal cartel behavior [may] be imposed only through prosecutions
initiated by the Government'. 35 The UK and Northern Ireland, Ireland and The
Netherlands also pointed out that none of them would dream of giving cartel
cases to juries which are 'swayed by emotional appeals', 36 a comment more
notable for its accuracy than its tact. 37 (As a side note, Ireland does in fact give
criminal cartel cases to juries. In March 2006, two years after the Empagran brief,
the Competition Authority secured its first criminal conviction, by a jury, against
Michael Flanagan (trading as Flanagan Oil), who was fined €3,500 for his participation in a domestic heating oil cartel. 38 )
Belgium and Germany made this point about rejecting the US private litigation system even more aggressively. Not only did their governments reject
many of the remedial aspects of US private litigation, but they did so in part
because of a conscious policy decision to prefer public anti-cartel enforcement to private anti-cartel enforcement. Thus Germany stated that '[w]hile
in Germany private parties can also claim damages, see GWB § 33, Germany's
focus in obtaining the desired deterrent effect of illegal restraints of trade is on
prosecution through its competition authorities.' 39 Similarly, Belgium noted
that '[i]n Belgium, although private claims for damages are available in civil
courts, the Belgian competition regime primarily utilizes a number of administrative and enforcement bodies to investigate and prosecute violations of the
Belgian Act.' 40
The consensus of the government amici briefs on these points should be
of interest to Latin American governments. Although the foreign amici briefs
nominally spoke only for themselves, they clearly intended to convey a unified message about how antitrust enforcers from around the world viewed the
importance of private anti-cartel enforcement in their own jurisdictions. We
now turn to the relevance of these arguments for anti-cartel enforcement in
Latin America.

34

UK Brief, above n 31, at *5.
Canada Brief, above n 31, at *2.
36
UK Brief, above n 31, at *15.
37
I have been similarly critical of the role of juries in antitrust cases, although cartel cases are, of all
antitrust cases, the ones in which juries probably perform the best. See Daniel A Crane, 'Technocracy
and Antitrust' 86 Texas Law Review 1159 (2008). In any event, this point is largely moot in the context
of this article, since very few other jurisdictions use juries for antitrust cases.
38
Global Competition Review, The 2008 Handbook of Competition Agencies, available at http://
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/7 / sections/ 16/chapters/ 161 /ireland.
39
Germany Brief, above n 31, at *11-12. Despite this disclaimer, in 2005 Germany adopted an
amendment to its Competition Act that has led to significant enhancement in private party damages
claims following on public findings of competition law infringements. ICN, Interaction of Public and
Private Enforcement in Cartel Cases, Report of Cartels Working Group to International Competition
Network Annual Conference (Moscow, May 2007), at 2.
40
Germany Brief, above n 31, at * 13.
35
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II. The Status of Anti-Cartel Enforcement
in Latin America
Generalizing about competition institutions in a region as vast and diverse as
'Latin America' is a dangerous undertaking, particularly for an outsider such as
myself. 41 The suitability, practicability and relative importance of private anticartel enforcement may differ on a country-by-country basis. Nonetheless, there
are some general points that can be made. In this section, I make two: first, public
anti-cartel enforcement in Latin America is progressing, but only cautiously and
sometimes unevenly; and, secondly, there are a number of general obstacles to
the success of private anti-cartel enforcement that need to be addressed if private
enforcement is to become an effective tool.

A. Anti-Cartel Enforcement and Private Rights
of Action-Country Summaries
What is the status of anti-cartel enforcement in Latin America, both public and
private? To give what I understand to be a representative taste, I summarize some
key findings from a recent OECD Peer Review Report on competition policy in five
leading Latin American jurisdictions.
1. Argentina

The OECD Report commends Argentina for giving its National Commission for
the Defense of Competition (CNDC) 'sufficient investigative tools for anti-cartel
work'. 42 Recent enforcement actions in the cement industry resulted in record fines
of US $106 million, and another US $24 million was imposed for price fixing in the
liquid oxygen industry. 43 But despite the existence of adequate procedural tools,
such as dawn raids, and the success of some high-profile enforcement actions,
the OECD reports that it is suspected that 'cartel activity is rife in Argentina' and
that the CNDC may not have the political will to move aggressively against cartel
behavior. 44 Private parties can initiate proceedings by lodging a complaint with the
Commission, and there is theoretically a private right of action for damages. 45

41
There is relatively little academic literature available in the United States on antitrust enforcement
in Latin America. The available sources include Thomas W Studwell, 'Latin American Competition
Law in the Twenty-First Century: A Practical Guide' 10 Law & Business Review of the Americas 747
(2004); Ignacio de Leon, 'Institutional Analysis of Competition Policy in Transition and Developing
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2. Brazil
Brazil's Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica (CADE) has stepped up
anti-cartel enforcement in the last decade, particularly since 2003. 46 For example,
a 2004 price-fixing decision fined the distributors ofliquid petroleum 15 per cent
of their annual revenues and imposed an additional fine of 10 per cent of the
company's fine on each company's owner. 47 Brazil has adopted an effective leniency program. 48 Under Article 29 of Law 8884, private parties may file damages
actions for antitrust violations under the Consumer Defense Code. 49 However,
there are no available records of how many such private cases have been filed, and
Brazilian authorities believe that the number is small. 50

3. Chile
As noted earlier, there is some uncertainty as to whether cartel behavior is per se
illegal in Chile. There have been a few anti-cartel prosecutions, including a 1995
pharmacy case where three incumbent pharmacies were fined about US $80,000
and a fourth new entrant about half that amount. 51 In general, the O ECD Report
describes the Chilean approach to competition law enforcement as 'cautious'.
Chile has a theoretical private right of action for damages for violation of competition law, but such an action cannot proceed until a Commission has found that
the defendant violated the law, because a civil court would not be independently
competent to make such a decision. 52 Competition authorities do not track the
number of private cases filed, and the frequency of such cases is unknown. 53
4. Mexico
Following ratification of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mexico adopted a Federal Law of Economic Competition (LFCE), which was
intended to move Mexico toward more robust market competition. 54 Until the
mid-1980s, prices for most goods and services were fixed by law, usually as the
result of agreements by 'business chambers' subject to the control of the Ministry
of the Economy. 55 In the early years of the LFCE, the competition authorities
devoted much of their time to rooting out the old 'business chamber' cartel culture. 56 Since 1998, the pace of such enforcement has slowed considerably. There has
been only one criminal enforcement-a 2000 price-fixing case involving tortilla
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manufacturers. 57 Similarly, anti-cartel enforcement outside the business chamber
arena has slowed to a trickle in recent years. 58 The Federal Competition Commission
(CFC) feels that it needs enhanced tools, including dawn raid and leniency powers,
better to combat cartels. 59 Under Article 39 of the LFCE, when the CFC has found
an antitrust violation, private parties that can prove in a Commission proceeding
that they suffered damage may sue the responsible party in court for damages. 60
Through 2002, at least, no such actions had been initiated. 61

5. Peru
Competition enforcement in Peru is conducted by the Institute for the Defense
of Competition and Intellectual Property (INDECOPI), an autonomous government agency that generally receives good marks for its independence and vigor. 62
In the 1997 landmark 'chicken case', INDECOPI fined a poultry cartel over US
$2 million for price-fixing activities. 63 Private parties may initiate INDECOPI
proceedings, but the Commission is not authorized to award damages. If the
Commission finds a competition law violation, that finding is conclusive proof in
any subsequent private action for damages in court, but it is unknown whether
any such actions have been filed. 64

6. Summary
The general tenor of the OECD's Report is to praise the enforcement institutions
for meaning well and taking some positive steps toward establishing anti-cartel
precedents and raising the visibility of the prohibition on price fixing and other
cartel behavior. However, an equally important theme is that the victories so far
have been largely symbolic, and that many Latin American economies remain rife
with unchallenged cartel behavior. As to private enforcement, one can perhaps
draw on an analogy that a US court once drew to the Louvre's statue of the Venus
de Milo: she is 'much admired and often discussed, but rarely embraced'. 65 While
theoretically available everywhere, it seems that private anti-cartel enforcement is
a rare occurrence. The next section considers why this may be.

B. Hurdles to Private Enforcement
From a chauvinistic US perspective, it is tempting to say that private anti-cartel
enforcement does not succeed in Latin America (as it does not in much of the
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world) precisely because of the absence of most of the characteristics of US civil
litigation that drew the ire of the foreign government amici in Empagran-treble
damages, discovery, class actions, juries, joint and several liability, no right of
contribution among defendants, contingency fees, attorney fee-shifting, etc. And
indeed, the EU's 2005 Green Paper and 2008 White Paper on private antitrust
enforcement recognized many of these features as being possibly necessary to
achieve effective private enforcement. 66
But other jurisdictions need not mimic the entire US system in order to have
effective private antitrust enforcement. Rather, in keeping with the overall perspective of the foreign government amici, private enforcement needs to grow
indigenously-to appropriate existing institutions and apparatuses rather than to
attempt to transplant US features wholesale. With this in mind, I consider three
of the most significant obstacles to effective private anti-cartel enforcement that
need to be addressed, but which need not necessarily be addressed as they are in
the US.

l. Aggregation of Claims
As noted earlier, in its Empagran amicus brief the Irish Government pointedly
noted that class action treatment was foreign to Irish law. Is the availability of
class actions necessary to any effective antitrust enforcement? The answer is no,
although with some exceptions.
Class actions-or any claim-aggregation procedure-need not be available for
private antitrust enforcement to succeed when there is concentrated harm from
the anti-competitive conduct. This is particularly true as to monopolization or
abuse of dominance, for example, where the most likely plaintiff is an injured
competitor. Class actions are not necessary for private enforcement to succeed
against Microsoft when firms like Novell and AOL stand ready to jump into the
breach.
On the other hand, some form of claim-aggregation procedure is necessary
when the harm of the conduct is almost entirely dispersed on thousands or
millions of consumers, none of whom has a sufficient individual incentive or
resources to sue. Unlike in the Microsoft case, where consumers were injured
but so were competitors, cartel behavior often does not injure competitors at all.
Unless there is some mechanism for aggregation of the claims, the availability of
the private right of action may remain a theoretical possibility only.
Paradoxically, even though the US has by far the most liberal class action rules
in the world, the need for class actions in cartel cases may be weaker in the United
States than in much of the rest of the world. This is because antitrust standing
rules in the US tend to give standing to large corporate buyers like wholesalers

66 White Paper, Commission of the European Communities, 'Damages for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules' (SEC, Brussels, April 2, 2008); Green Paper, Commission of the European
Communities, 'Damages for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules' (SEC, Brussels, Dec 19, 2005).
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or retailers rather than consumers-plaintiffs who suffer concentrated harm.
The US generally follows a 'direct purchaser' rule, in which the direct purchasers
of the price-fixed good have standing to sue even though they may have passed
on the overcharge by reselling the good at a marked-up price and hence avoided
economic injury. 67 Conversely, injured consumers who pay a higher price but do
not purchase directly from the cartelists are denied standing. 68
But this does not appear to be true in most other jurisdictions that are developing private anti-cartel enforcement. According to a 2007 study of a number of
jurisdictions by the International Competition Network (ICN), while the vast
majority of the jurisdictions surveyed had not explicitly considered either the
direct purchaser rule or the 'passing on' defense, most would probably invoke
unjust enrichment principles to deny recovery to a wholesaler or retailer who
simply passed on the overcharge. 69 Conversely, the ICN study concluded that the
vast majority of surveyed jurisdictions would probably allow suits by indirect
purchasers. 70 In other words, in most jurisdictions the parties with standing to sue
cartels are often going to be the end users who suffer widely dispersed harm and,
hence, have relatively little incentive to sue.
So some form of claim aggregation is important, but it need not mirror the US
model. The ICN reports that class actions are available in five of the jurisdictions
it surveyed.7 1 It also notes that there is a variety of similar models for aggregating claims, including public interest litigation, representative actions, joinder of
individual claims and parens patriae litigation. 72
One interesting example is Brazil's Consumer Defense Code (Law 8078),
which creates a series of state and local consumer protection agencies called
'Procons' that are located in all 26 Brazilian states, in the Federal District
(Brasilia), and in 670 municipalities. The Procons, either upon a consumer
complaint or their own initiative, can initiate class action lawsuits for damages
on behalf of injured consumers. 73 Similarly, Brazilian law allows non-governmental
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consumer organizations to file antitrust class actions seeking damages. 74 As
noted earlier, very few such cases have been filed, but at least there is an indigenous model of claim-aggregation that could be brought to bear on the collective action problems that cartels create.

2. Access to Information
A major impediment to private anti-cartel enforcement in many jurisdictions is
that private plaintiffs often lack the procedural tools necessary to obtain information about the cartel. Since cartels are usually covert and secretive, amassing the
documentary evidence necessary to make out a case often proves difficult.
The United States is often thought to be particularly plaintiff-friendly because
of its liberal discovery rules-which essentially allow plaintiffs to demand that
the defendants produce any documents that are relevant to the plaintiffs' claims. 75
While depositions of the defendants' executives are also allowed, those may be
less available in cartel cases since the individuals may choose to invoke their Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Nonetheless, US discovery rights
tend to be very broad.
Recently, however, the availability of discovery in cartel cases may have been
somewhat contracted. In Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs in cartel cases must plead facts which, if true, would
directly establish the existence of the conspiracy, and that they may not simply rely
upon the existence of parallel behavior by the defendants in the marketplace. 76
This pleading must occur-and be sufficient to satisfy the trial court-before the
plaintiffs can get any discovery. In other words, plaintiffs must have some internal
evidence of the conspiracy before they can use the process of discovery to search
for additional evidence supporting their claim.
Pre-trial discovery is said to be virtually non-existent in many Latin American
jurisdictions. 77 As long as this remains true, it is doubtful that a regime of effective private anti-cartel enforcement can emerge. It is not helpful to respond that
in many jurisdictions potential private plaintiffs are able to participate in the
anti-cartel proceedings brought by the competition authorities and, hence, gather
some information that may be useful in subsequent civil litigation. That makes
private litigants' access to court entirely dependent on a prior enforcement action
by the competition authorities. As I will discuss momentarily, perhaps the chief
benefit of private enforcement is to spur the competition authorities to action
when they are otherwise disposed to do nothing.
When it comes to international cartels, it might be thought that the best
solution for private litigants in jurisdictions without strong discovery rights
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is to free-ride on discovery efforts in more discovery-friendly jurisdictions,
particularly by seeking documents or other information collected in US discovery.
But that solution also turns out to be largely illusory. United States courts often
impose strict protective orders on the litigants that prohibit them from sharing
information learned in discovery, or using that information for any purpose other
than the conduct of the case. Similarly, information collected by US antitrust
enforcement authorities pursuant to civil investigative demands must be treated
as confidential and cannot be disclosed to third parties. 78
Some form of private discovery in Latin American jurisdictions is thus critical
to the success of private anti-cartel enforcement. The obvious problem is that
the absence of discovery rights is not peculiar to anti-cartel enforcement-it is
a deeply-rooted aspect of Latin American civil litigation culture. Perhaps the
Twombly decision suggests a plausible model for justifying creating some limited discovery rights in cartel cases: plaintiffs should not be able to get access
to documents and other evidence from defendants unless they can assert
facts-with a reasonable degree of particularity-evidencing the existence of the
conspiracy. Such a threshold requirement for getting discovery would prevent
the filing of speculative, harassing or unfounded claims. And what facts might
count as sufficient to open the door to discovery? As to international cartels,
the fact that the defendant has been indicted on charges of international cartel
behavior in another jurisdiction, or that plaintiffs in another jurisdiction have
unearthed facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss-as disclosed in a court
decision-should perhaps count as sufficient (assuming, of course, that the
defendant also does business in the relevant Latin American jurisdiction). In this
way, facts unearthed in other jurisdictions could serve as an influential threshold
showing in Latin American antitrust litigation-a showing sufficient to accord
the private plaintiffs their own discovery rights.

3. Judicial Competence and Acceptance
The OECD Peer Review Report on Latin America notes as to Mexico that the
competition authority's (CFC) experience in the district courts before generalist
judges does not augur well for private enforcement. 79 It notes that 'the further
maturation of Mexico's antitrust environment, especially in the courts, is necessary before private actions can become a significant feature of competition
policy enforcement'. 80 Judicial competence to try complex antitrust matters
is a serious problem the world over, and may particularly be an issue in Latin
America. 81
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Fortunately, judicial competence is probably the least serious problem as to
cartel cases. Certainly, it takes a judge very knowledgeable about economics
and antitrust principles to try an abuse of dominance, rule of reason, merger
or price discrimination case. But cartel cases often involve fewer questions of
economic policy-after all, the per se rule (in those jurisdictions that follow it)
is intended to simplify the plaintiff's proof and avoid difficult balancing questions. Of course, cartel cases are not free from difficult economic questions. An
important and complex issue will often be how to calculate and allocate the
plaintiffs' damages. But, in general, cartel cases are the easiest of private antitrust cases for generalist judges to handle. They are in many ways much more
like traditional fraud or conspiracy cases with which commercially sophisticated
judges will be familiar.
There is also the possibility of creating specialized antitrust courts, or allowing the existing competition courts to hear private cases. For example, Canada
is cautiously experimenting with opening up its Competition Tribunal-which
until recently has been reserved for Competition Bureau enforcement-to private
litigants. Similarly, the Indian Competition Commission, which was created by a
2002 overhaul of India's antitrust laws, has the power to award compensation to
any person who makes application seeking compensation from any enterprise
for any loss or damages caused by a violation of the competition law. 82 Similar
moves may be constitutionally barred in jurisdictions that employ a completely
administrative-as opposed to judicial-process for competition enforcement.
In that case, it may be wise to focus on seminars and other forms of training on
private cartel litigation for commercial judges-if not the creation of specialized
antitrust courts.

III. The Benefits and Limits of Private
Anti-Cartel Enforcement
We come, finally, to the question 'Why?' Why should Latin America look favorably on private anti-cartel enforcement? In this last section, I first make the case
for private anti-cartel enforcement (although not necessarily the conventional
case). I then acknowledge and examine a key limitation of private anti-cartel
enforcement-a limitation that justifies the position of the German and Belgian
Governments that private anti-cartel enforcement will always remain secondary
to public enforcement. Finally, I try to quell some of the most alarmist suspicions
about allowing private anti-cartel enforcement-particularly the view that this

82 T Ramappa, Competition Law in India: Policy, Issues, and Developments 269 (New York, Oxford
University Press, 2006).
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would be a Trojan Horse, leading to an unbounded, US-style system of private
antitrust litigation.

A. The Benefits of Private Enforcement
There has been much talk in recent years about the benefits of private anticartel enforcement. In its Empagran amicus brief, the UK Government informed
the Supreme Court that it recognized the need to enhance private antitrust
enforcement in the UK. 83 In 2008, the European Commission produced a White
Paper on the need for a more efficient system for bringing damages claims for
infringement of EC antitrust law. 84 The ICN's 2007 study on private anti-cartel
enforcement noted that 'there have been a number of substantial changes in the
last few years in many national legal systems to improve the situation of private
plaintiffs'. 85
But what is the value of private anti-cartel enforcement? In the literature, it is
common to hear about two primary objectives: enhanced enforcement because
of greater resource commitment, and compensation of injured parties. 86 I will
briefly argue that compensation is overrated as a justification for anti-cartel
enforcement, that resource enhancement is a good justification, but that there is
a third-and even more compelling-justification that has not received sufficient
attention.

I. Compensation
There is no doubt that it would be socially desirable to use antitrust law to compensate the victims of cartels, just as it is good to use the law to compensate people
who have been robbed. 87 Unfortunately, antitrust law does a very poor job of this.
This is not because courts, agencies and plaintiffs ignore compensation goals.
Rather, it goes back to an earlier point in this chapter about the widely distributed
nature of cartel harms. If 10 million people have each paid $20 too much for vitamins, the overcharge from the cartel is $200 million, a large sum to be sure. But
the cost of identifying each of the 10 million people and issuing them a refund

83
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check in proportion to their purchases, may well exceed the $20 each person paid
in overcharges.
The US experience on this is illustrative. Realizing that the costs of issuing checks to the members of the injured class were often prohibitive, creative
lawyers instead invented other ways in which the injured consumers could be
compensated. For example, the settling lawyers would have the defendants agree
to issue coupons to class members that could be used against future purchases
from the defendants. Often, these coupons go unclaimed and unused. Further,
they can simply encourage the defendants to raise the price of their products
(thus wiping away any compensatory benefit), or can cause inefficient overconsumption by the compensated class. 88 In 2005, the US Congress passed the
Class Action Fairness Act, 89 which was designed to rein in perceived abuses in
coupon settlements.
I do not claim that the parties injured by cartel behavior are never fairly compensated in private litigation. If the injured party is a large business purchaser that
buys the price-fixed item for incorporation into another product (say, for example, a hospital that buys medical supplies, or a car company that buys steel) and
faces elastic demand for the downstream product it sells, it may actually absorb
a large share of the overcharge and recoup meaningful sums of money through
private litigation. Consumers, however, rarely get much valuable compensation
from private anti-cartel litigation (which is not to say that they do not benefit
from private anti-cartel enforcement). After lawyers' fees and administrative fees,
each consumer's share of the recovery is often negligible, even though the harm
across the class is great. Compensation is a much more attainable goal of private
antitrust enforcement in cases where the harm is concentrated than in cases where
it is widely dispersed.
2. Resources
If compensation is a noble but fairly unrealistic goal of private anti-cartel
enforcement, adding further resources to the fight against global cartels is both
a noble and realistic goal. In the United States, we often refer to the benefits of
having 'private attorneys general', 90 private lawyers who perform a public function. One of the chief reasons for having private attorneys general is that the
resources of the existing attorney general are often limited. Further, the budgets
(not to mention aggressiveness) of public enforcers are usually dependent on
the will of the legislature or other organs of government, and hence may ebb
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and flow with changes in overall budgetary priorities. Private antitrust enforcers
are not dependent on budgetary allocations, and hence provide a steady stream
of enforcement regardless of the resources (or politics) of the administration
in office.
The amount of money invested in public antitrust enforcement in Latin
America seems trivial compared with the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement
(much less all competition law enforcement). Argentina's 2005 CNDC budget
was less than US $750,000, with only 53 devoted person-years. 91 Chile's National
Economic Prosecutor's Office had a budget of US $2.25 million in 2001, but
that office has responsibilities beyond antitrust enforcement. 92 In 2003, Peru's
IND ECO PI had a budget of only US $183,000. 93 Of the five countries surveyed
by the OECD, Brazil with US $7 million in competition enforcement resources
in 2004 94 and Mexico with a competition law enforcement budget of almost
US $16 million in 2002 95 had the most well-funded antitrust enforcers. But
even those numbers seem trivial compared with the challenges of anti-cartel
enforcement.
To put the Latin American budgetary numbers in perspective, consider the fact
that the attorney's fees award made to the primary law firm representing the class
of domestic purchasers in the Christie's/Sotheby's commission-fixing case was
over $27 million. 96 And, mind you, the auction house attorney's fees award was
not some unusually high fluke. If anything, it was lower than many comparable
attorney's fees awards, because the federal district judge, Louis Kaplan, submitted
the lead attorney role to competitive bidding. 97 In other words, the attorney's fees
awarded in a single US cartel case where the judge reined in the attorney's fees
exceeded the entire annual competition enforcement budgets of the first, second,
third, fifth, and seventh largest Latin American economies combined.
Of course, such comparisons are not entirely fair. A dollar buys you much more
enforcement in Latin America, where labor costs are lower, than it does in the
US-although, of course, the quality of the services may vary by country. And the
attorney's fees awarded to the Boies, Schiller law firm in the auction house cases
represented a share of the settlement, not their actual expenses. But still, there is
no doubt that the level of resources devoted to public anti-cartel enforcement in
Latin America is far too low to do the job adequately. Adding a meaningful system
of private enforcement would quickly multiply the resources devoted to protecting Latin American consumers.
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3. Competition for Enforcement
One benefit of private anti-cartel enforcement that has not received much
attention should be obvious to antitrust lawyers: competition. Of course, we
all hope that better anti-cartel enforcement will produce more competition in
commercial markets, but enhancing private enforcement can produce a different kind of competition-competition among antitrust enforcers for more
rigorous enforcement.
Part of the problem with relying solely on public enforcement is that public
enforcement becomes an institutional monopoly. As with any monopoly, public
enforcement monopolies will tend toward lethargy, conservatism (in its worst
sense), risk aversion and inaction. Indeed, the prospect of enhanced private
enforcement may sometimes draw the opposition of the incumbent antitrust
enforcers precisely for the same reasons that State-owned enterprises resist the
introduction of private competition. As already mentioned, the OECD Peer
Review Report noted (with some exceptions) cautious and often inadequate anticartel enforcement in Latin America. The introduction of private enforcement
would provide incentives for more vigorous public enforcement. 98
Take, for example, the often-made claim that private enforcement can interfere with public enforcement by altering the balance of incentives that cartelists
have to participate in leniency programs or to plead guilty to criminal charges.
There is a simple solution to this problem: allow competition authorities to grant
immunity-partial or full-from civil liability to cooperating defendants. 99 In
order to take advantage of this primacy over cartel enforcement, however, the
enforcement agencies would actually need to investigate the case, crack the cartel
using leniency programs or other enforcement tools, and reach a resolution with
the cartelists. The presence of a vibrant culture of private litigation would give
public enforcers greater incentives to pursue cartels vigorously in order to avoid
being shown up by private enforcers. From a public choice perspective, governmental enforcers are assumed to maximize advancement of their own careers. 100
It would not look good politically for private enforcers to win case after case that
the public authorities had not even investigated.
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As noted earlier, the Governments of Belgium and Germany cautioned that
private enforcement should always be secondary to public enforcement. Even
if that view prevails, it is quite sensible to keep private enforcement as a residual
option to give the public enforcers the necessary incentives to do their jobs well.

B. The Limits of Private Enforcement
Having lauded the benefits of private anti-cartel enforcement, I must now take
a step back and acknowledge a limit of private enforcement. Indeed, there is an
oddity about placing emphasis on the importance of private anti-cartel enforcement. Even if private enforcement were encouraged, the consumers whose injury
corresponds mostly closely to the greatest social harm of the cartel behavior
would not typically be the parties bringing suit. To understand this, it is necessary
to take a quick trip back to the economic foundations of antitrust policy.
When a cartel raises prices above competitive level, it causes at least two distinct kinds of harm. First, some consumers who would otherwise have purchased
the product are no longer willing to purchase it at the higher price. Hence, they
substitute to a second-best preference-which probably is not sold by the cartelists. We refer to the losses of these consumers as 'deadweight' losses, because they
represent a class of forgone transactions that should have, in a competitive market, taken place. Economists identify these deadweight losses as the primary (or,
to some, only) social costs of cartel behavior. They are a social cost because they
result in misallocation of social resources-of customers buying their second-best
rather than first-best preferences.
The second class of harm accrues to consumers who continue to purchase
the product at the higher price. Their injury is a wealth transfer from consumers to producers. This is not necessarily inefficient in an economic sense, since it
merely transfers money from one person to another (as opposed to affecting the
deployment of scarce resources directly). There is nothing that can tell us a priori
that the money is better off in the hands of consumers than in the hands of the
producers-for example, if the price-fixed product is a luxury good, the price fixing
may work as a progressive tax on rich consumers for the benefit of poor artisans.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to make a detailed analysis of whether
wealth transfers are an important subject of antitrust enforcement. The important
point is that deadweight losses are clearly harmful and part of the core-if not the
core-of antitrust enforcement. But private parties who sue cartels typically will
not be suing to vindicate the interests of the consumers who stopped buying the
price-fixed good because it was too expensive. For example, imagine the difficulty
of representing a class of purchasers who stopped buying vitamins because of the
vitamins cartel, or, even worse, who never started buying vitamins because of the
excessive prices. How would you prove who they were, or quantify their injury? It
is much easier to recover damages on behalf of purchasers who made the purchase
but paid too much. There, the formula is simply to posit a but-for price and take
the difference between the actual price and the but-for price as damages.
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Private anti-cartel enforcement tends to focus on a set of purchasers and injuries that are, in my view, secondary in the hierarchy of antitrust concerns. Private
enforcement does not seek compensation for or meaningfully analyze the key
concern over deadweight losses. On the other hand, public enforcers typically seek
penalties, not damages, and do not have to establish standing to sue or make the
case on behalf of any particular class of purchasers. Rather, they can focus on the
overall social harm of the conduct, and pursue remedies designed to deter and
prevent such conduct in the future.
Hence, I am inclined to agree with the German and Belgian Governments that
private anti-cartel enforcement is conceptually secondary to public enforcement.
This is not a reason to deny private enforcement. Rather, it buttresses my earlier
point that perhaps the most important function of private enforcement is to spur
the government to action.

C. Private Anti-Cartel Enforcement Need Not Open

Pandora's Box
There is a good deal of skepticism in Latin America and around the world about
creating US-style mechanisms for private enforcement of antitrust law. One
often hears that private litigation in the US is out of control. The example of the
woman who recovered $2.9 million from McDonald's after spilling hot coffee on
herself is legendary the world over. 101 I have been told by an individual involved
in framing a new antitrust law in an Asian jurisdiction that this story is invoked
whenever the possibility of private enforcement is mentioned. In its Empagran
amicus curiae brief, the UK cited a report of the UK Department of Trade and
Industry finding that
many US commentators 'view the number of private antitrust cases in the US as too
high' particularly because of 'unscrupulous lawyers ... quick to file vexatious actionsattracted by the prospect of treble damages'. 102

Interestingly, even the OECD, which is generally supportive of enhanced competition enforcement, has expressed concern over the availability of a private right of
action in the few Latin American jurisdictions where such a right exists. Consider,
for example, the following statement from the OECD's Peer Review Report on
Brazil:
Private plaintiffs in Brazil may file suit against seeking [sic] antitrust damages under Law
8884 and other laws. Just as exposure to prosecution under the Economic Crimes Law
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can deter pro-competitive behaviour, exposure to private suits for antitrust damages can
do likewise. Private damage suits may be commenced in any of Brazil's first instance
courts, and there is no information available to determine how frequently such suits are
undertaken or how often they result in awards against conduct not properly characterised as anti-competitive. One method for confining private suits to legitimate claims is
to amend the law so that such suits may be filed only against parties and conduct that
have been subject to a specific finding of illegality by CADE. Such an amendment could
include a sunset clause under which the restriction would lapse after a certain number
of years unless renewed. Such a clause would provide an opportunity to collect information about and assess the record of private antitrust enforcement in Brazil. If such
legislation is not considered appropriate, efforts should nevertheless be undertaken to
collect information going forward about the volume, nature, and outcome of private
antitrust litigation. 103

This paragraph strikingly reveals the depths of the antipathy toward private rights
of action in antitrust. Despite concluding earlier in the same Report that there
have probably been very few private antitrust cases filed in Brazil, the authors of
the Report were prepared to recommend at least a temporary moratorium on all
independently initiated private antitrust actions so that a study could be done to
ensure that the few private cases filed (if any) were not chilling pro-competitive
behavior.
I am not unsympathetic to the claim that meritless private antitrust actions
can chill pro-competitive behavior. One of the chief criticisms of private antitrust
enforcement is that private rights of action lead to abusive suits by competitors. 104 In the United States, about two-thirds of private enforcers of antitrust are
aggrieved competitors or other businesses vertically related to the defendant;
fewer than 20 per cent are consumers. 105 There is ample evidence that businesses
sometimes (and I believe often) abuse the private right of action by filing lawsuits
that are primarily designed to harass their competitors and prevent vigorous competition and other efficient practices.
This concern, however, should not deter the creation of a private right of action
directed against hard-core cartel behavior. Competitors typically will not have
standing to sue the members of a cartel because they are not usually injured by
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cartel behavior. To the contrary, if the cartel succeeds in raising prices in the
market, this will usually redound to the benefit of any firms that do not join the
cartel. Indeed, returning for a moment to Oliver Wendell Holmes's 'bad man'
perspective, the ideal position of a seller is for his competitors to form a cartel,
raise prices artificially high, and implement strict production quotas. The nonparticipating seller can then make a fortune by 'cheating' slightly on the cartel
price and vastly expanding his market share at a lucrative price.
Of course, some cartels can have exclusionary effects-for example, if they not
only agree to fix prices, rig bids or divide territories, but also agree to boycott or
otherwise impose economic sanctions on non-participating rivals. For example,
the 1997 chicken case in Peru noted earlier involved a cartel agreement by poultry
producers to limit production, exclude new entry, and even knock some existing
producers out of the market. 106 But if abusive suits by competitors of this stripe
are a concern, one could limit the reach of the private right of action by specifying that only plaintiffs who have been injured as purchasers from or sellers to a
cartel can sue.
The specter of private litigation running amok-of greedy lawyers harassing innocent businesses-is a real concern. But, in this regard, there is a vast
difference in incentives and opportunities for abuse between private abuse of
dominance litigation and private anti-cartel litigation. Abusive litigation is a comparatively minimal concern if the proposal is to establish a well-tailored program
of private anti-cartel enforcement.

IV. Conclusion
This chapter has offered a US perspective on opening up private anti-cartel
enforcement in Latin America. Writing from a US perspective comes with both
benefits and drawbacks. The benefit is that the US has far more experience with
private anti-cartel enforcement than any other jurisdiction. The drawback is that
much of the world deliberately rejects many of the features of US civil litigation
that make private enforcement so prevalent. Nonetheless, the trend around the
world, including in the jurisdictions that filed the Empagran amici briefs, is to
open up private antitrust enforcement. If there is any place for such measures,
it is with respect to cartels, particularly international cartels. Private anti-cartel
enforcement in Latin America need not follow a US model. It would be advisable, however, to move in the direction of building indigenous models that are
sustainable and effective in bringing the benefits of private enforcement to Latin
American consumers.
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